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I. INTRODUCTION

In the waning days of his presidency, William J. Clinton authorized the
United States signature of the Rome Treaty establishing an International
Criminal Court (ICC), making the United States the 138th country to sign the
treaty by the December 30th deadline. According to the ICC Statute, after
December 31, 2000, States must accede to the Treaty, which requires full
ratification-something that was not likely for the United States in the near term
given the current level of Senate opposition to the Treaty. While signature is
not the equivalent of ratification, it sets the stage for United States support of
Security Council referrals to the International Criminal Court, as well as other
forms of United States cooperation with the Court. In addition, it enables the
United States to continue to seek additional provisions to protect American
personnel from the court's jurisdiction.
Clinton's action drew immediate reaction from Senator Jesse Helms,
Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who has
been one of the treaty's greatest opponents. In a Press Release, Helms stated:
"Today's action is a blatant attempt by a lame-duck President to tie the hands
of his successor. Well, I have a message for the outgoing President. This
decision will not stand. I will make reversing this decision, and protecting
America's fighting men and women from the jurisdiction of this international
kangaroo court, one of my highest priorities in the new Congress."'
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During the 107th Congress, Helms is likely to resurrect the
"Servicemembers Protection Act," Senate Bill 2726, which he initially
introduced in June 2000. The Act would prohibit any United States
Government cooperation with the ICC, and cut off United States military
assistance to any country that has ratified the ICC Treaty (with the exception of
major United States allies), as long as the United States has not ratified the
Rome Treaty. Further, the proposed legislation provides that United States
military personnel must be immunized from ICC jurisdiction before the United
States participates in any United Nations peacekeeping operation. The proposed
legislation also authorizes the President to use all means necessary to release
any United States or allied personnel detained on behalf of the Court.2
II. INFLUENTIAL INSIDER OR HOSTILE OUTSIDER?

The inescapable reality for the United States is that the ICC will soon enter
into force with or without United States support. As this is being written, thirty
countries have already ratified the treaty, and 139 have signed it indicating their
intention to ratify.3 Sixty ratifications are necessary to bring it into force. The
Signatories include every other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
State except for Turkey. Three of the Permanent Members of the Security
Council (France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) have signed it. Both of the
United States' closest neighbors (Mexico and Canada) have signed it. And even
Israel, which had been the only Western country to join the United States in
voting against the ICC Treaty in Rome in 1998, later changed its position and
signed the Treaty.4
The question facing the Bush Administration, then, is whether its interests
are better served by playing the role of a hostile outsider (as embodied in Jesse
Helms' "American Servicemembers Protection Act") or by playing the role of
an influential insider (as it has done for example with the Yugoslavia Tribunal).
In deciding on a course of action, the Bush Administration must recognize the
consequences that would flow from the hostile approach.
First, the hostile approach would transform American exceptionalism into
unilateralism and/or isolationism by preventing the United States from
participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations and cutting off aid to
many countries vital to United States national security. Further, overt
opposition to the ICC would erode the moral legitimacy of the United States,
which has historically been as important to achieving United States foreign
2.
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policy goals as military and economic might. Perversely, the hostile approach
may even turn the United States into a safe haven for international war
criminals, since the United States would be prevented from surrendering them
directly to the ICC or indirectly to another country which would surrender them
to the ICC.
Second, the United States would be prevented from being able to take
advantage of the very real benefits of an ICC. The experience with the
Yugoslavia Tribunal has shown that, even absent arrests, an international
indictment has the effect of isolating rogue leaders, strengthening domestic
opposition, and increasing international support for sanctions and even use of
force. The United States has recognized these benefits in pushing for the
subsequent creation of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Sierra Leone, as
well as proposing the establishment of tribunals for Cambodia and Iraq. But the
establishment of the ICC will signal the end of the era of ad hoc tribunals.
Under the hostile approach, when the next Rwanda-like situation occurs, the
United States will not be able to employ the very useful tool of international
criminal justice.
The United States opponents of the ICC have suggested that without
United States support, the ICC is destined to be impotent because it will lack the
power of the Security Council to enforce its arrest orders. But as the ad hoc
Tribunals for Rwanda and Sierra Leone indicate, in most cases where an ICC
is needed, the perpetrators are no longer in power and are in the custody of a
new government or nearby states which are perfectly willing to hand them over
to an ICC absent Security Council action. Moreover, the Security Council has
been prevented (by Russian veto threats) from taking any action to impose
sanctions on States that have not cooperated with the Yugoslavia Tribunal
despite repeated pleas from the Tribunal's Prosecutor and Judges that it do so.
Indeed, in the Yugoslavia context, where the perpetrators were still in power
when the Tribunal was established, it was not action by the Security Council,
but rather the withholding of international loans that have induced Croatia and
Serbia to hand over two dozen indictees. This indicates that, unlike the League
of Nations (which United States opponents of the ICC have frequently referred
to in this context), the ICC is likely to be a thriving institution even without
United States participation. In other words, the United States may actually need
the ICC more than the ICC needs the United States.
The third problem with the hostile approach is that the United States
achieves no real protection from the ICC by remaining outside the ICC regime.
This is because Article 12 of the Rome Statute empowers the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States who commit crimes in the
territory of State Parties. Opponents of the ICC have attempted to negate this
problem by arguing that international law prohibits the ICC from exercising
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jurisdiction over the nationals of non-parties.5 In a lengthy article in Law and
Contemporary Problems, I provide a detailed critique of this legal argument,
pointing out that it is not supported by the historic record or guiding
precedents.6 But far more important than what I have to say is the fact that the
representatives at the ICC Prep. Con. have rejected the argument, indicating that
the ICC Assembly of State Parties and the ICC itself are extremely unlikely to
accept it.
If United States officials can be indicted by the ICC whether or not the
United States is a party to the Rome Treaty, then the United States preserves
very little by remaining outside the treaty regime, and could protect itself better
by signing the treaty. This has been proven to be the case with the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, which the United States has supported with contributions exceeding
$15 million annually, the loan of top-ranking investigators and lawyers from the
federal government, the support of troops to permit the safe exhumation of mass
graves, and even the provision of U-2 surveillance photographs to locate the
places where Serb authorities had tried to hide the evidence of its wrongdoing.7
This policy bore fruit when the International Prosecutor opened an
investigation into allegations of war crimes committed by NATO during the
1999 Kosovo intervention. Despite the briefs and reports of reputable human
rights organizations arguing that NATO had committed breaches of
international humanitarian law, on June 8, 2000 the International Prosecutor
issued a report concluding that charges against NATO personnel were not
warranted. 8 I am not suggesting that the United States co-opted the Yugoslavia
Tribunal, but when dealing with close calls regarding application of
international humanitarian law it is obviously better to have a sympathetic
Prosecutor and Court than a hostile one.
Il.
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provide a detached risk-benefit analysis of the foreign policy and national
security consequences of the question facing the new Administration.9
The risks to United States servicemembers presented by the ICC have been
greatly exaggerated, while the safeguards contained in the ICC Treaty have been
seriously underrated. But to the extent that such fears are valid, United States
opposition to the ICC will only increase the likelihood that the ICC will be more
hostile than sympathetic to United States positions. And, ironically, by
opposing the Court, the United States would likely engender more international
hostility toward United States foreign policy than could result from an
indictment by the Court. Thus, whether or not the United States is able to
achieve additional safeguards to prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction
over United States personnel, it will be in the interests of United States national
security and foreign policy to support, rather than oppose, the ICC. This does
not require immediate ratification. Perhaps it is better to let the Court prove
itself over a period of years before sending the treaty to the Senate. But when
the next Rwanda-like situation comes along, the Bush Administration will find
value in having the option of Security Council referral to the ICC in its arsenal
of foreign policy responses.
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